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Abstract: Financial regulation in sports is usually discussed in the context of 
representing an instrument against “financial doping”. Notwithstanding the merits 
of this discussion, this paper takes the opposite perspective and analyses how 
market-internal financial regulation itself may anticompetitively influence sporting 
results. Virtually every regulative financial intervention distorts sporting 
competition to some extent and creates beneficiaries and losers. Sometimes, the 
actual winners and losers of financial regulation stand in line with the (legitimate) 
goals of the regulation like limiting financial imbalances or preventing distortive 
midseason insolvencies of teams. However, financial regulation may also display 
unintended side-effects like protecting hitherto successful teams from new 
challengers, cementing the competitive order, creating foreclosure and entry 
barriers, or serving vested interests of powerful parties. All of these effects may also 
be hidden agendas by those who are implementing and enforcing market-internal 
financial regulation or influencing it. This paper analyses various types of budget 
caps (including salary caps) with respect to potentially anticompetitive effects. 
UEFA’s so-called Financial Fair Play Regulations are highlighted as an example. 
Furthermore, the paper discusses allocation schemes of common revenues (like 
from the collective sale of broadcasting rights) as another area of financial 
regulation with potentially anticompetitive effects. Eventually, the effects of 
standards for accounting, financial management, and auditing are discussed.  
Keywords: sports economics, financial regulation, budget caps, salary caps, 
financial fair play, financial doping, collective sale of media rights, sports 
broadcasting rights, revenue sharing 
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1. The Role of Financial Regulation in Professional Sports 
Imbalanced financial means among competitors in a sports league or championship 
are an evergreen in sports economics as well as in sports policy (see for more 
details Schubert & Hamil 2017). The main concern is that financial imbalances lead 
to an uneven playing field where some competitors have better chances to win 
than others from the outset on. The notion of a team buying success is often an 
unpopular one in sports, even in professional and commercial sports. It seems to 
violate values of integrity and fairness of sporting competitions. How can it be in 
line with the ideals of sporting competition if Paris St. Germain with a budget of 
about € 550 million – and being able to pay more than € 200 million for just one 
player (Neymar) – competes against SC Amiens (with a budget of ca. € 25 million) 
in the premier football league of France? How can better talent play a role when 
Sebastian Vettel races in an approx. € 380 million-budget Ferrari against Kevin 
Magnussen in a roughly € 115 million-budget Haas in Formula One? The underlying 
notion of the unfair character of such financial imbalances is well expressed in the 
recently popular term of financial doping (Gammelsæter & Senaux 2011; Morrow 
2011; Könecke & Schubert 2014; Schubert & Könecke 2015; Schubert & Hamil 
2017). 
On the other hand, financial imbalances are also a direct consequence of success in 
sports competition. Traditionally, the more successful team often directly earns a 
monetary-valuable price. More importantly, more success increases the probability 
of becoming popular with the fans (the consumers). This leads to more income 
from ticket sales, the sale of merchandise as well as the sale of media rights like 
broadcasting. Furthermore, the attractiveness for sponsors increases, generating 
more income from this side as well. In other words, even if all teams of a league 
start with the same budget, differences in performance will lead to differences in 
budgets and financial means. How can it be fair, if these hard earned financial 
advantages are taken away by regulation? Wouldn’t that imply an unfair advantage 
for the worse performing team, for the lesser talent? 
In reality, however, there is no level-playing-field starting point in professional 
sports. There have always been ‘external’ financial injections – be it through 
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wealthy fans, overly-generous sponsorships, eager local politicians, local companies 
or other ways (see the examples from Schubert & Hamil 2017). Motives can differ a 
lot, sporting enthusiasm, local patriotism and loyalty, power over a famous toy, 
prestige and fame, reputation of individuals and brands, etc. The ability to acquire 
such ‘external’ financial injections may be independent from sporting success and 
talent to some degree and partly accidental. Moreover, the delineation of internal, 
‘earned’, financial means and external, ‘not earned’, financial injections is blurry 
and ambiguous. A donation can be a fan enthusiastically desiring to help his club 
or a wealthy business man looking for a new toy. Sponsorship money can be a 
sharp calculated advertising effort or motivated by local patriotism and loyalty – or 
even driven by empire building desires of managers. Taxpayer money can be 
injected to promote the local sports culture and competitiveness as well as the local 
economy and tourism – or to please sports fans and influential locals in order to 
maximize votes at the next election. Why should one motive to invest money into 
sports be allowed and ‘fair’ and the other not? How shall one reliably discriminate 
between different motives for investment? Shouldn’t this be done for motives of 
sports club members and buyers of sports club stocks as well?  
Things get even more complex if the inherent dynamics are considered (economies 
of sporting success). Due to a self-reinforcing effect of success and revenue 
increases – more budget due to sporting success in t1 may lead to higher winning 
probability in t2 implying more revenues for t3, etc. – the inherent imbalances from 
the sporting dynamics may be substantial. Even if all revenues are deserved 
through past sporting success, they still can lead to a situation where the now rich 
club can lay back and rely on its superior financial power to stay at the top – 
without current superior skills or talents. Ironically, poorer teams may now need an 
‘external’, ‘not earned’, financial injection just to be able to compete with the rich 
team again – and be able to showcase current skills and talents. 
Notwithstanding, there is no systematic market failure in professional and 
commercial sports leagues (or other championship types) that would 
unconditionally require financial regulation. First, the connection between budget 
and success is neither immediate nor always prevalent. However, if there was no 
connection at all, the financial doping discussion would be irrelevant. But it is an 
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imperfect relation; the highest budget does not always win. The recurring lack of 
success of VW-sponsored VfL Wolfsburg in German Bundesliga or Toyota in 
Formula One (2002-2009) – in both cases despite their budgets being among the 
highest – represent examples. Second, the connection between success and 
popularity (and thus between success and income) may be confused by external 
popularity factors pushing fan demand (local patriotism, same social class image, 
superstar effects, sympathy, tradition built upon distant past success, media 
coverage, boulevard media presence, etc.; Budzinski & Pannicke 2017). These 
factors may be less important in sports than in other entertainment industries but 
they are still there. In European premier football leagues, between 49.3 (English 
Premier League) and 72.1 (German Bundesliga) per cent of the revenues of the 
teams come from sources like ticket sales, hospitality, merchandise, sponsoring and 
advertising, sale of players, and other commercial activities (Budzinski 2017a). All 
these revenues are only imperfectly connected to success and regularly teams in 
lower positions (or even in lower leagues) earn more from these revenue categories 
than some of their higher placed competitors. This also illustrates that sports 
leagues neither represent fitting examples for Akerlof-type rat races, nor for strict 
positional competition (see for details Budzinski 2014, 2017a). Neither do revenues 
directly and inevitably depend on the ranking position, nor are there incentives to 
produce unproductive signals. Furthermore, the additional effort is not waste and 
the “prize” (the revenues) the teams are competing for is very dynamically 
increasing. Actually, it requires a special type of financial regulation to create a 
position-dependency of some revenues – namely, the collectively collected media 
revenues (see section 3).1  
Despite the absence of market failure, there may be economic reasons for financial 
regulation, like adverse incentives and moral hazard problems fuelled by bail-out 
expectations in the case of running insolvent if the teams/clubs are sufficiently 
prominent (too prominent to fail, Budzinski 2014: 88-90; soft budget constraints, 
                                                            
1 While between 50.7 (English Premier League) and 27.9 (German Bundesliga) per cent of the 
revenues are generated from the collective sale of broadcasting rights, the existence of strict 
position-dependency revenues require a specific type of distribution of these revenues (see section 
3), which, strictly speaking, does currently not exist in these leagues (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017: 
11-12).  
5 
 
Andreff 2007; Storm & Nielsen 2012). From an economic perspective, this is 
particularly worrying if taxpayer money is used to bail-out badly-managed teams 
(zombie races; Franck 2014). Often, however, financial regulation is motivated by 
fairness considerations or by the goal to make sporting competition closer 
(competitive balance considerations; see also section 3). 
In sports markets, financial regulation typically takes the shape of a market-internal 
institution, implemented and enforced by a market-internal regulator (see for more 
details Budzinski & Szymanski 2015; Budzinski 2017b). This type of regulation is not 
government regulation. Instead, the market participants give themselves rules and 
create a body (some type of sports association2) to govern these rules. While this is 
highly unusual for ‘ordinary’ textbook markets, it follows the fundamental sports 
economic logic that competitors in a sports market must cooperate on the rules of 
the game (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964). Naturally, once a market-internal 
regulator exists, it enjoys market power (more or less depending on the 
institutional structure; Budzinski & Szymanski 2015) and may extent its governance 
beyond the necessary rules of the game and into commercial activities. 
Furthermore, principal-agent-problems may create room for the market-internal 
regulator to pursue other goals than the benefit of the (league or championship) 
participants or the sports in question. Consequently, real-world financial regulation 
may indeed be motivated by the desire to protect the integrity of the sport. 
However, it may also be motivated by underlying goals and agendas that serve 
partial interests of some stakeholders or the self-interest of the governing sports 
association.3    
Altogether, the topic of financial imbalances and financial regulation in sports is a 
difficult one. Disentangling sportingly-deserved income advantages from 
                                                            
2 Examples include such diverse organizations as, inter alia, the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA), the International Olympic Committe (IOC), the National Football League (NFL), 
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the Union des Associations 
Européennes de Football (UEFA), the United States Soccer Federation (USSF), the Niedersächsischer 
Judoverband (NJV), or the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA). 
3 Budzinski & Müller-Kock (2017) discuss an interesting case where financial regulation serves as a 
means to secure and exploit the market power of a sports promoter and to stabilize an 
anticompetitive cartel. This example represents an extreme case showcasing how manipulative to 
the sporting outcome financial regulation can be. 
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sportingly-not-deserved revenues is an ambitious task and perhaps a mission 
impossible (see the discussion on UEFA’s Financial Fair Play in section 2). Both 
financial imbalances and financial balance may be viewed to be unfair and against 
the spirit of sports as the discussion so far has demonstrated. In this chapter, the 
second view is in the core of the reasoning: financial antidoping may actually itself 
manipulate results and restrict competition.4 Section 2 analyses various types of 
budget caps and their possible restrictive effects on competition. Section 3 
addresses an often overlooked element of effectively financial regulation, namely 
the distribution of common revenues and the re-distribution of competitors’ 
income through market-internal regulation. Eventually, section 4 very briefly 
discusses accounting standards as financial regulation before section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Budget Caps 
2.1 Types of Budget Caps 
Direct financial regulation takes the shape of various forms of budget caps. The 
concept of a cap is to define a maximum monetary ceiling, for instance, for a class 
of expenditures.   
‐ A global budget cap covers all types of expenditures of a team, whereas a 
partial budget cap only limits spending of a specific class of expenditures 
(e.g. salary caps for players, transfer payment caps, or an engine 
development freeze like in some types of motor racing where the 
expenditures on improving the engine are capped). 
‐ An absolute or symmetric cap limits all budgets to the same nominal 
amount, whereas a relative or asymmetric cap prescribes different maximum 
budget volumes to different teams.  
‐ A static budget cap defines the maximum spending, whereas a dynamic cap 
limits the growth rate of the budget. 
                                                            
4 For the first view see with a comprehensive literature review Schubert & Hamil (2017). 
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‐ Budget caps can also regulate income instead of expenditures. A universal 
cap limits a total income or revenue measure of a team, whereas a 
discriminatory cap only limits income or revenue from defined sources. 
Obviously, different types can be combined. A general problem with all types of 
budget caps is evasive actions by the regulated teams – either as creative 
exploitation of loopholes or as outright illegal conduct. These evasions of 
regulation may difficult to detect and/or hard to police due to asymmetric 
information, enforcement power deficits or other various reasons. If budget caps 
are imperfectly enforced, a distortion of sporting competition surfaces because 
now the most creative and sophisticated cheaters enjoy a competitive advantage. 
This stands hardly in line with the integrity of the sport. In reality, many budget 
caps will fall short of being sufficiently enforceable. Notwithstanding, for the sake 
of the argument, I assume perfectly enforceable caps in the next section. 
2.2 Distortive Effects of Budget Caps on Sporting Competition   
All types of budget caps change the market allocation of budgets and as such 
distort competition in comparison to the market result. For instance, an absolute 
global budget cap sets a ceiling to total expenditures (Bc). For teams i with a 
budget Bi, for which Bi > Bc the cap entails a competitive disadvantage (= there 
financial competitive advantage is eroded), whereas teams with Bi < Bc benefit 
because their budget disadvantage is reduced. The distortive effect compared to a 
free market situation increases with ǀBi – Bcǀ. Of course, this distortive effect may 
exactly be the goal of the financial regulation since it effectively reduces the spread 
among the budgets and levels the financial playing field. If even the natural budget 
of the poorest team would exceed the cap, then the regulation enforces financial 
equality. In the latter case, the parameter of competition “acquiring financial 
means” is effectively and completely eroded. While being a rather radical 
instrument, absolute global caps create comparatively few anticompetitive effects. 
They merely devaluate one dimension of competition in a multidimensional 
contest. 
Partial budget caps are similar to global caps if the capped expenditure class is the 
dominant parameter of competition, like with salary caps for player wages in ball 
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team sports.5 However, if competition is significantly multidimensional, for 
instance, when competition on equipment and technology plays an important role 
(skiing equipment, swimsuits, technology in motor racing, etc.), shifting effects 
occur. Richer teams will keep spending more in this scenario than poorer teams but 
they will shift their expenditures to non-capped classes. For instance, when a motor 
racing series introduces a cap on spending for engine development (engine 
development freeze) like Formula One did a couple of years ago, high-budget 
teams will not stop spending their higher financial means. Instead, they will shift 
their expenditures to chassis development, aerodynamics improvement, or driver 
and engineer wages, for instance. Possible effects (depending on the specific 
design of the partial cap) may include, inter alia, 
‐ competitive disadvantages for those teams that were lagging behind in the 
capped area at the time of the cap introduction because they are now stuck 
with an inferior technology/equipment and cannot invest to catch up. 
‐ competitive advantages for those who specialized in the non-capped area 
because now this parameter of competition plays an increasing role. 
‐ counter-intuitively also competitive disadvantages for those not-so-rich 
teams who specialized in the non-capped area because now all the money 
from the rich teams is thrown at this area of development/competition and 
efficiency of money use becomes less paramount here as does niche 
competence/specialisation. 
Already from these sketches it becomes clear that the effects of partial caps are 
rather ambiguous and depending on the specific design. At the same time, the 
effects on the competitive order are not neutral at all. Some sporting-relevant 
competences become devalued, other appreciate, creating non-trivial distorting 
effects on competition. 
Relative/asymmetric caps are very directly of anticompetitive concern because they 
cement inequality. That some teams are allowed to spend more than others by 
regulation appears to be at odds with most fairness notions from the outset on. 
Still, there is the example of Financial Fair Play that is briefly discussed below. In the 
                                                            
5 See on the analysis of salary caps in team sports, inter alia, Dietl et al. (2011, 2012). 
9 
 
shape of freezing current budgets (perhaps to prevent ruinous budget wars), 
asymmetric caps cement the competitive order at the time of their introduction and 
prevent poorer teams from catching-up investments, thus protecting competitive 
advantages of the rich teams like market power rents. In general, asymmetric caps 
artificially cement or create financial inequality. 
Whether budget caps are static or dynamic does not change the effects of 
symmetric, global or partial caps (but dynamic caps may align a control of 
spending behaviour with a growing market, i.e. increasing revenues). Dynamic 
asymmetric caps, however, may increase the inherent artificial inequality of 
asymmetric caps compared to static ones. If the cap addresses income or revenue 
figures instead of expenditures, the effects on sporting competition do not change 
considerably. Capping total income implies that you cannot spend more than the 
cap volume (provided that financing through liabilities is included in total income). 
A discriminatory income cap, i.e. a cap on defined sources of income or revenue, 
does have distorting effects on sporting competition if teams have different 
strengths in different income/revenue categories. Those teams who are either 
strong in the capped category or need to rely on it because they can substitute 
income/revenue sources suffer competitive disadvantages in favour of those who 
are comparatively stronger in the non-capped sources. Adding asymmetry and 
dynamics aggravates the anticompetitive effects. 
2.3 The Example of UEFA Financial Fair Play   
In order to illustrate the possible distorting effects on sporting competition from 
financial regulation (or financial antidoping), I follow Schubert & Hamil (2017) and 
address a prime example of complex and ambitious regulation – UEFA’s Financial 
Fair Play (FFP) regulations (see for detailed descriptions and discussions, inter alia, 
Vöpel 2011; Budzinski 2014; Franck 2014, 2016; Maxcy 2014; Peeters & Szymanski 
2014, 2015; Preuss et al. 2014; Szymanski 2014; Madden 2015; Sass 2016; 
Schubert et al. 2016). It represents a rare example of an asymmetric/relative budget 
cap combined with a discriminatory cap on certain revenue types. Obvious from the 
name of the regulation, financial fairness is the prime target and the integrity of 
sports plays a prominent role in its justification.  
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More precisely, it is one element of the overall FFP regulations that triggers the 
budget cap effect, namely the so-called break-even rule (originally from 2010; 
latest version: UEFA 2015): relevant expenses must not exceed relevant income 
(with an acceptable deviation of up to € 5 million over three financial years6). Thus, 
the budget of any given team is capped by the relevant income it can create. This 
constitutes an asymmetric budget cap since the relevant income differs among 
clubs. A team that has earned more money is allowed to spend more than a 
competitor with less relevant income, i.e. a ‘richer’ team is allowed to spend more 
than a ‘poorer’ team.  
The UEFA defines relevant income in great details. Somewhat simplified, it includes 
direct football-playing revenues (like sales of tickets, beverages & food during the 
games and media rights, UEFA price money, or player transfer profit), sponsorship 
and advertising revenues, government subsidies and grants, and indirectly football- 
or brand-related revenues (like merchandise or commercial activities exploiting the 
clubs’ brand as well as lottery revenues). Many of these ‘relevant’ income sources 
rest upon the brand value and popularity of a team and/or past success. For 
instance, Real Madrid enjoys significantly more income from media rights, 
sponsorship, advertising, merchandise, or brand exploitation than FC Copenhagen 
(FC København; FCK) – irrespective of current management talent. Moreover, many 
of these categories will not respond quickly to sporting success. In other words, 
even if FCK sensationally wins the UEFA Champions League, Real Madrid’s income 
from most of these sources will remain significantly higher than those of FCK for a 
considerable period of time. This implies that FCK will be restricted by UEFAs 
budget cap to spend significantly less than Real Madrid irrespective of sporting 
success (and management talent)! In itself, this will drastically reduce the 
probability of FCK continuing to beat Real Madrid. Real Madrid is, in effect, 
protected by FFP from getting its market leading position challenged by FCK on the 
basis of (management, playing, other) talent and skills alone. 
In other words, UEFA FFP regulations prevent less famous but talented teams (the 
newcomers) to close the financial gap to the famous frontrunners at the time of 
                                                            
6 See for more details on exceptions and acceptable deviations UEFA (2015). 
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FFP introduction (the incumbents). The asymmetric budget cap cements the 
financial unlevel-playing field and blocks poorer clubs from challenging richer clubs 
on talent. As such, the asymmetric budget cap creates a relevant anticompetitive 
effect: it contributes to cementing the competitive order and protects the 
incumbents from talent-based competitive challenges. In a way, the budget cap 
crates an entry barrier to the premier market segment in European football. While 
this takes place under the label “financial fair play”, it certainly can be questioned 
how “fair” this actually is. UEFA’s ostensible financial antidoping definitely serves as 
an anticompetitive arrangement in this regard, manipulating sporting competition 
and further cementing unequal opportunities. 
Now, if FCK cannot challenge Real Madrid on talent alone, it needs investment to 
bridge the financial gap. However, here the second element of FFP kicks in: it is also 
a discriminatory budget cap in relation to allowed income sources. In order to 
target this aspect, a closer look at – according to UEFA FFP – non-relevant income is 
necessary. Income from any of the following sources is not considered to be 
‘relevant’ and does not increase the budget that teams are allowed to spend 
(simplified; see for details UEFA 2015: 76-81, 87-91): 
‐ non-monetary credits/income, including revaluations and 
appreciation/depreciation of tangible or intangible fixed assets and 
inventories, 
‐ income transactions above fair value, for instance, sponsorship 
arrangements generating revenues in excess of what is standard business 
practices in the market, similarly supra-market revenues from corporate 
hospitality tickets and/or use of executive boxes as well as generally from the 
sale of goods and services, 
‐ donations, 
‐ debt waivers,  
‐ revenues from non-football operations not related to the club (i.e. its brand), 
‐ income in respect of a player for whom the club retains the registration, i.e. 
if a player (or the transfer rights to a player) who remains on the roster is 
sold to a third party in order to create immediate revenue. 
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As the budget is capped to ‘relevant’ income, income from these ‘non-relevant’ 
sources must not be part of the competition budget. While obvious enforceability 
problems of these categories are not subject to analysis here, these regulations, in 
essence, block a number of options for financing investment into talent. It is the 
economic nature of investment that it is not covered by past and current earnings. 
Instead, it represents the promise of a share from future earnings, of course, 
associated with a risk factor. Some of the options regarding this standard business 
practices are blocked by FFP. Furthermore, financial injections from benefactors are 
largely blocked as well. The discriminatory element of the FFP budget cap further 
strengthens the anticompetitive effects of the financial regulation since it 
effectively blocks several ways for newcomers to finance investment to bridge the 
financial gap to the incumbents. Thus, it further protects the incumbents’ rents and 
competitive positions from challenges by newcomers. 
The second effect is, at least partly, deliberate: combating the (perceived) distortion 
of competition by financial injections from wealthy benefactors (sometimes labelled 
sugar daddies in the literature; Lang et al. 2011; Franck 2014; Sass 2016) and/or 
companies (examples like Paris St. Germain and Manchester City come to mind). 
And, indeed, buying success by throwing a lot of money from outside of the sport 
appears to be the prime example of financial doping (Schubert & Hamil 2017). 
When it comes to fairness, however, this story can be told in different ways. On the 
one hand, buying success sounds unfair, on the other hand, foreclosure of the 
market and no real chance for other teams than the big incumbents to win on a 
European level sounds unfair as well. RB Leipzig represents an interesting case in 
question. Leipzig is a traditional football city in Germany with a high number of 
dedicated fans. The former famous Leipzig football club, Lokomotive Leipzig (and 
its successors), lost all competitiveness due to long periods of mismanagement. 
Eventually, Red Bull stepped into the vacuum and created a new team – RasenBall 
Leipzig – and with a combination of financial injections (outside UEFA’s FFP world) 
and clever management it competed through the ranks and now provides a new 
challenge to the best football clubs in Germany’s Bundesliga. Is it unfair 
competition – or would it rather have been unfair to, in effect, permanently deter 
Leipzig’s football community from premier-level football experience? After all, 
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without the financial injections, it does not seem to be possible to enter the top 
segment of the market, even in a longer period of time. 
The break-even rule of UEFA’s FFP regulation serves as an example of an 
asymmetric and discriminatory budget cap and its anticompetitive effects – the 
cementing of the competitive order, foreclosure of the premium market segment, 
and protection of the incumbents’ rents and power. Whether they are unwanted 
and non-anticipated side-effects of pursuing ‘good’ goals (financial fair play) or 
whether the incumbents – the big traditional European football clubs – merely 
sought to prevent a challenge to their powerful position (and implemented a 
genius market label for their anticompetitive effort by using the financial fair play 
moniker) is open for discussion and analysis. Different storytelling is possible. This 
chapter deliberately took the view of possible manipulative effects of financial 
regulation targeting financial antidoping and, as such, does not provide a balanced 
analysis of UEFA’s FFP (see the literature quoted at the beginning of the section for 
more comprehensive analyses). 
 
3. Allocation of Common Revenues as Financial Regulation 
Virtually all professional sports leagues and championships generate common 
revenues through the marketing of the common product (for instance, use of the 
league brand for advertising and merchandising, but also for league/championship 
title sponsorships like the “Monster Energy NASCAR Cup Series”, etc.) and, more 
often than not, through a centralized sale of media rights, in particular traditional 
and online broadcasting rights. These common revenues are either collected by the 
market-internal regulator (the competent sports association) itself or by a promoter 
who is usually in the ownership of either or both the competent sports association 
and/or the participating teams.7 These common revenues need to be distributed 
among the participating teams and the way this is done represents another avenue 
                                                            
7 Formula One motor racing represents a notable exception where the promoter is an independent 
investment company seeking to maximize its own profits from the sport. This creates scope for 
market power abuses by the promoter at the expense of the competing teams (see for details on 
this case Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017).  
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of financial regulation. Depending on how the common revenues are distributed, 
different effects on sporting competition result. 
Four different types of distribution, which represent economically speaking 
horizontal allocation mechanisms, can be distinguished (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 
2017: 5): 
- equal allocation, i.e. each team receives the same share of the common 
revenues, 
- performance-based allocation, i.e. teams that perform better (higher win or 
points score, better position in the championship ranking, etc.) receive a 
higher share of the common revenues than those with worse performances,  
- reverse-performance-based allocation, i.e. teams performing better receive a 
smaller share of the common revenue than those who perform worse, and 
- brand-value-based allocation, i.e. teams with a larger fan-base (however this 
is measured) and/or a higher marketing potential (past success, traditions, 
etc.) receive higher shares of the common revenues.  
Obviously, each category (except of equal allocation) covers a wide range of 
allocation schemes with different degrees of inequality of the revenue allocation. 
Of course, these categories can be combined, for instance, a defined percentage of 
the common revenues may be allocated equally, another percentage performance-
based, etc.8  
Regarding the effects of these allocation mechanisms, it needs to be considered 
whether the revenues could alternatively be collected individually by the teams, as 
in the case of broadcasting rights. This is less realistically possible with series/league 
title sponsorships and brand licensing revenues. In the case of a collective sale of 
broadcasting and related media rights in team sports leagues, the individual 
broadcasting rights of the teams regarding their home games are tied into one 
league-wide bundle, thus completely eroding competition among suppliers of 
broadcasting rights. This constitutes a hardcore cartel that subsequently acts as a 
monopolist towards the customers (directly: media companies buying broadcasting 
                                                            
8 For an overview and a discussion of allocation schemes used by selected premier-level professional 
leagues and championships see Budzinski & Müller-Kock (2017: 9-13). 
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rights; indirectly: media consumers9). While this clearly creates anticompetitive 
effects like higher prices, limited quantity, and reduced innovation dynamics (for 
instance, regarding innovative new media coverage), the literature is split on 
whether (sufficiently strong) countervailing efficiency gains exist that justify this 
cartel (Késenne 2000, 2009; Falconieri et al. 2004; Gürtler 2007; Noll 2007; Peeters 
2011, 2012; Budzinski 2017b). If an individual sale system is possible, opting for a 
collective system implies that the distribution of financial means among the teams 
is changed. If the common revenue is inevitable collective in nature, no such 
benchmark exists. Still, the allocation mechanism affects sporting competition. 
If no competitive benchmark exists, a case can be made for equal allocation 
representing the least distortion of sporting competition. The common product 
rests on the cooperation of all participants and, thus, all participants equally share 
its revenues. Another case can be made for brand-value-based allocation. The 
hypothetical contributions to the value of the common product/brand may not be 
equal. More popular teams with higher fan-bases may contribute more to it than 
less popular ones. Thus, defining proxies for brand value (or fan share/popularity) 
may imperfectly reflect the actual contribution to the generation of the common 
revenues and, thus, may represent the ‘best’ allocation. Performance-based and 
Reverse-performance-based allocations, however, will always include some 
distortive effects, either advantaging better-performing or lower-performing teams.  
If a competitive benchmark like the option of an individual sale system of 
broadcasting rights exists, distortive effects relate to the allocation that would 
result from the competitive solution. Then, a brand-value based allocation basically 
attempts to mimic the competitive benchmark because popularity, fan-base and 
similar aspects largely determine the value of a team’s brand. Current performance 
is certainly another factor in this. However, teams with popular names (brands) will 
draw more demand even if they perform worse than no-name teams. 
Consequently, brand-value based allocation systems have the lowest distortive 
effects and the closer they mimic the competitive benchmark, the lower is the 
                                                            
9 If, for instance, a TV station spent more for sports broadcasting rights due to the monopoly-like 
price structure dictated by the cartel, then the whole TV audience will have to contribute to the 
higher prices by accepting higher pay-TV prices, more advertising in free TV, and less investment in 
other (also non-sports) programs. 
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distortion effect. Equal allocation, in contrast, alters the allocation compared to the 
competitive benchmark and distorts sporting competition in the sense that it 
disadvantages those teams that could earn higher media revenues in an individual 
sale system. In other words, in tendency, teams that are very popular with the fans 
suffer and less popular teams gain. Performance-based allocations also distort 
sporting competition as they benefit better performing teams irrespective of their 
popularity with the fans. Thus, bad-performing popular teams lose, whereas good 
performing low-popularity teams win in financial terms. With reverse-performance-
based systems, it is the other way around (bad-performing-low-popularity teams 
gain, good-performing-high-popularity teams lose).10 Keep in mind that from a 
consumer (fan) welfare perspective disadvantaging popular teams is, ceteris 
paribus, welfare decreasing since (somewhat tautologously) more people are made 
happy when popular teams win than when unpopular teams win.  
So far, brand-value-based allocation mechanisms appear to be the least distortive 
ones regarding the implicit financial regulation following from distributing 
common revenues. Note, however, that mirroring the competitive benchmark very 
closely makes it harder to justify the existence of a cartel (collective sale system) 
with its far-reaching anticompetitive effects. On the other hand, economic 
considerations may motivate the choice of a specific allocation scheme that benefit 
consumers (fans) and welfare in the end. In other words, common revenues may 
purposefully be employed to improve sporting competition. Systems of equal 
allocation and reverse-performance allocation, for instance, follow competitive 
balance considerations. By advantaging poor-performing teams, their ability to 
compete with the previously successful ones shall be enhanced and improved, thus, 
creating closer and more balanced competition. The underlying economic rationale 
is – somewhat simplified – that more competitive balance increases the uncertainty 
of outcome, which in turn make the sporting competition more attractive to fans 
and, consequently, increases demand and fan welfare (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 
1964; El-Hodiri & Quirk 1971; Fort & Quirk 1995). If this were true, it would 
represent a justification to deviate from the competitive benchmark. However, since 
                                                            
10 It is quite notable and interesting, how such a perspective contrasts with and goes beyond first 
glance fairness notions. 
17 
 
the – very substantial – sports economics literature on the demand and welfare 
effects of competitive balance is very controversial (inter alia, Szymanski & Késenne 
2004; Coates et al. 2014; Humphreys & Zhou 2015; Budzinski & Pawlowski 2017; 
literature overview: Pawlowski & Nalbantis 2017), the (beneficial) effects of equal 
or reverse-performance based allocation mechanisms probably needs to be 
demonstrated case-by-case. Systems of performance-based allocation follow 
incentive considerations. Financial incentives to perform better add to intrinsic 
motivation to win. While this may be unnecessary when it comes to meaningful 
contests like winning the league or the championship, research has shown that it 
may be necessary to keep competition alive in the midfield, in particular towards 
the end of a season (Feddersen et al. 2012). Whether these limited additional 
effects can justify an otherwise anticompetitive cartel (collective sale systems), 
however, appears to be doubtful. 
From an economic perspective, indirect financial regulation through the allocation 
of common revenues plays an important role when it comes to potential distortive 
effects of financial regulation. Different allocation schemes affect sporting 
competition in different ways and to different extents. Since the real world of 
sports is both manifold and creative in this respect, this chapter can outline some 
basic considerations and each case must be carefully looked at. This becomes even 
more important if one considers that the internal allocation of common revenues 
may well be motivated by power struggles and (individual or collective) 
anticompetitive intentions instead of goals such as the attractiveness of the sport 
and fan welfare (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017). 
A similar phenomenon is represented by explicit mechanisms to re-allocate 
individual revenues among the teams. Gate-revenue sharing (inter alia, Késenne 
2000), for instance, may imply that each team collects its own revenues at the gate 
but then pays a share of these revenues into a common pool, which then is re-
allocated among the teams, usually with the poorer teams (in terms of gate 
revenues) receiving a net-benefit in financial terms (like the NFL straight-pool 
sharing arrangement from 2001). So-called luxury taxes implement a (progressive) 
tax on spending above a defined budget threshold (Dietl et al. 2010). The tax 
revenues are then distributed among all teams. Thus, it both sets disincentives to 
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budget expansion (without a ‘hard’ budget cap) by making it more expensive and 
re-allocates financial means within the league. Examples are the luxury tax 
arrangements of U.S. Major League Baseball (MLB) and the U.S. National Basketball 
Association (NBA). These instruments of financial regulation have in common that 
they follow competitive balance considerations and fall into a comparable category 
as systems of equal allocation and reverse-performance-based allocation as 
discussed above. 
 
4. Standards for Sound Financial Management 
Another area of financial regulation is the implementation by mandatory standards 
for financial management, for instance, accounting standards or audit 
requirements. Such standards may be set as preconditions to acquire a license to 
participate in a league, tournament or championship. Many leagues have 
implemented a licensing system that require teams to submit financial data and 
business plans and provide external auditing reports according to predefined 
standards. A more specific example is another element of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, namely the so-called no overdue payables rule that stipulates that 
teams participating in UEFA’s club competition must not have overdue payments to 
players or other employees, other football clubs, or to social and tax authorities 
(UEFA 2015: 28-31). 
Standards for sound financial management, if properly defined and enforced, 
represent an effective instrument against overly expansive and excessively risky 
financial practices. Furthermore, they can considerably reduce the danger of teams 
running into insolvency mid-season. Mid-season insolvencies may disturb match 
operations and endanger the integrity of the competition. At the same time, the 
standards themselves do not distort sporting competition as long as they follow 
accepted business practices, are transparent and enforced in a non-discriminatory 
way, and rely on tools and competences that are available to all the participants. 
However, costs may be an issue; standards leading to very high costs of accounting 
and financial management may disadvantage poorer teams. 
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Financial guarantees and security deposits are a different story. On the one hand, 
they may also serve to safeguard economic viability of teams following the logic 
that sound finances are required to be able to provide the guarantees. Moreover, 
the deposited money may be used to keep a team going until the end of the 
season in the case of insolvency and, thus, prevent disruptive effects on match 
operations. On the other hand, guarantee and deposit requirements may work as 
entry barriers, in particular if they are excessive. Furthermore, adverse incentives 
and moral hazard problems may be reinforced when managers know they will be 
bailed-out by a fund. The German Bundesliga-case of Arminia Bielefeld provides an 
interesting example (Budzinski & Müller 2013: 276-278, 280-281). In the second 
level league (2. Bundesliga), teams could prevent insolvency by receiving financial 
means from an insurance fund (where all teams had contributed to) but had to pay 
a price in terms of three penalty points subtracted from the rankings. When 
Arminia Bielefeld found itself in a sportingly hopeless situation halfway through the 
2010-2011 season, it activated the insurance funds – and the penalty points 
effectively did not hurt them at all (they just remained dead-last). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Financial regulation in sports is usually discussed in the context of representing an 
instrument against financial doping. Notwithstanding the merits of this discussion, 
this chapter takes the opposite perspective and analyses how financial regulation 
itself may anticompetitively influence and manipulate sporting results. Virtually 
every regulative financial intervention distorts sporting competition to some extent 
and creates beneficiaries and losers. Sometimes, the actual winners and losers of 
financial regulation stand in line with the (legitimate) goals of the regulation. For 
instance, if the goal is to remedy financial imbalances, then a global and symmetric 
cap may generate the ‘right’ winners (low-budget teams) and losers (high-budget 
teams) – all in relative terms, of course. If the goal is to prevent mid-season 
insolvencies, a licensing system requiring defined standards for accounting, 
financial management, and external auditing may represent an adequate 
instrument. 
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However, in many cases the winners and losers of financial regulation do not match 
with the (announced) goals. This can be due to unintended consequences and side-
effects of regulation – a topic well-known in economic analysis. It can also be a 
consequence of vested interest of powerful regulatory bodies and/or participants 
(teams) that are sufficiently powerful to influence the market-internal regulator 
(lobbyism). Again, politico-economic deficiencies of real-world regulations are 
another well-known topic in economics. Unfortunately, these lines of reasoning 
have often been neglected in sports economics analysis so far.11 Real-world 
financial regulation, thus, may distort sporting competition by protecting 
competitive advantages of powerful teams, cementing the competitive order, 
deterring market entry by new team talent, serving the regulatory interests of 
sports associations and/or their officials, and many more. 
In this chapter, various types of budget caps (including salary caps and UEFA’s 
financial fair play regulations), different forms of allocation mechanisms of 
common revenues as well as financial standards are analysed regarding possible 
and potential anticompetitive effects. Inter alia, asymmetric budget caps, 
performance-based revenue allocation, and financial guarantees and security 
deposits are identified to produce anticompetitive effects with a considerable 
likelihood. Naturally, the analysis relies on stylized regulations and specific 
examples. It cannot offer a comprehensive discussion of all thinkable variations and 
combinations of financial regulation. As a consequence, the major implication is to 
advocate critical case-by-case (theory-driven and empirical) analyses of real-world 
financial regulation that focuses on the actual effects on competition and does not 
take the announced goals for granted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 But see Keshock et al. (2015) for an interesting story of political economy of sports events and 
promotion. 
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